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When studying recent welfare state reforms, do we need to look at the 
European level? What is at stake with the multiplication of European 
strategies in the social policy domain? Does a reference to Europe provide us 
with a new understanding of national welfare state reforms? What kind of 
influence may these European processes have on welfare state changes? The 
recent literature on welfare state transformation neglects the European level as 
an explanation for recent national reforms. Scholars searched for the causes of 
welfare reforms in globalisation or domestic factors, not in Europe; and 
analyses of the actual reforms have focused on institutional constraints in 
order to understand the remarkable continuity and remaining diversity of the 
European welfare states. Meanwhile, macro-economic policies have been 
more and more integrated at the European level, and since 1997, several 
European strategies have been developed in order to coordinate national 
social policy reforms in different fields (employment, social exclusion, 
pensions). Does the fact that European welfare states remain different imply 
that these common European processes are meaningless for welfare reforms?  
38 Bruno Palier
 
 The 1990s reveal an increasing contradiction between European 
economic policies and national social policies. This illuminates an often 
forgotten facet of the European Welfare states crisis, which is due to a double 
discrepancy: most economic policies are now decided at the European level 
when social policies are still - formally - decided at the national one; 
economic policies are now based on a neo-classical, supply-side approach 
when national social policies have long been merely linked with Keynesian, 
demand-side approaches. This contradiction has been the engine of the 
progressive Europeanisation of welfare reforms. During the 1990s, the new 
European macro-economic norms have progressively imposed some of the 
timing and the content of national welfare reforms. In reaction, to avoid 
economic actors imposing all their views on welfare states’ fates, member 
states accepted that Europe should start to deal with welfare issues, but in a 
soft and intergovernmental way. European strategies in the social spheres 
(employment, pensions, social exclusion) are not able (nor meant) to 
determine the national welfare reforms completely. In elaborating common 
welfare reform orientations, they help/incite national social policies to 
become more compatible with the economic policies (single market and 
currency) that are now decided at the European level. 
 The paper argues in the first part that national welfare reforms have 
been partly framed by European economic integration. In the second part, 
the emergence of European policies aimed at coordinating national 
employment and social policy reforms is analysed. The third part tries to 
sketch out the new welfare policy mix that emerges from the Europeanisation 
of welfare reforms.  
 The paper does not argue that Europe is the cause of welfare reforms. It 
argues, however, that a complete understanding of national welfare reforms 
should take Europe into account, as an intervening, cathartic and framing 
variable. Integrating European policies in the understanding of welfare 
reforms helps us to highlight the central issue of all current welfare reforms, 
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which is to elaborate a new social policy paradigm, based on a supply-side 
approach.1 
European economic policies and national social 
policies  
The numerous recent books on welfare state changes give very limited space 
to Europe.2 They show that, after some fifteen years of reforms, welfare states 
remain very different. The main explanandum explanandum for this result is 
national political and welfare institutions.  However, welfare reforms have 
more in common than is usually argued, if one refers to their dynamics (their 
timing and their general orientation), rather than to their current outcomes 
(the surviving welfare states are still very different). These similarities suggest 
that we take a closer look at European policies, starting with European 
economic policies. The interaction between European economic integration 
and the development of national welfare regimes seems to have been 
somewhat contradictory during the 1990s. This contradiction created a 
pressure on (national) welfare reforms to adapt to (European) economic 
requirements. 
European economic policies channel and bind welfare 
reforms 
In several continental welfare states, the timing of reforms is intriguing. A first 
wave of retrenchment reforms in insurance for old age, healthcare and 
unemployment was concentrated in the first half of the 1990s, during the 
preparation for the single currency: Amato (1992) and Dini (1995) pension 
reforms in Italy; various pension reforms (during the 1990s), and the 1992 
Seehoffer reform of healthcare in Germany; the 1992 unemployment 
insurance reform, 1993 Balladur pension reforms, and 1995 Juppé plan 
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(implemented as far as health insurance is concerned) in France (on all these 
reforms, see Palier and Martin 2008). The timing may be purely coincidental 
but governments justified these reforms as necessary means to meet the 
Maastricht criteria. Moreover, in the early 1990s, certain European countries 
(Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Spain, Italy) concluded social pacts 
including some important welfare state reforms. These social pacts explicitly 
referred to the preparation of the single currency as a justification for the 
reforms (Rhodes 2001).  
 One could argue that these reforms would have been necessary without 
Maastricht since the major problems are not linked with Europe, but with 
domestic developments, and that governments scapegoated Maastricht to 
avoid blame.3 Nonetheless, Maastricht helped governments, at least 
rhetorically, to impose otherwise almost impossible reforms, especially in the 
‘conservative corporatist’ welfare systems of continental Europe. Even if it is 
tempting to disregard them as merely symbolic, the justificatory references to 
Maastricht in the political discourse was a reason why any (rather than no) 
reform occurred (Schmidt 2002). To paraphrase Claudio Radaelli, EU 
economic dynamics became a part of domestic political discourse and public 
policies in the welfare state field, showing that welfare state reforms were 
partially europeanised4.  
 Moreover, the content of these measures differed from previous ones. 
All the reforms mentioned above involved social benefit retrenchment. 
Preparation for the single currency started in the recession years of the early 
1990s. The traditional (Keynesian) use of social policies in times of recession 
would be to sustain or even boost demand by increasing benefits. Here, the 
reaction was the opposite, imposing cuts in social benefits in a period of 
economic recession. This reversal has to be linked with the new economic 
context created by the implementation of the single market and by the 
preparation of the single currency under the Maastricht criteria. As Fritz 
Scharpf has demonstrated, European integration had a strong impact on 
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policy instruments available to governments. ‘The Maastricht criteria for 
joining the Monetary Union have practically eliminated deficit spending as a 
policy tool; and the realisation of the Monetary Union has completely 
removed monetary policy and exchange rate policy from the control of its 
member states’ (Scharpf 2000).  
 As a consequence, increasing social benefits and contributions (which 
means labour cost increase) as a solution to deficits created by temporary 
reflation policies was much less affordable than before, since it could not be 
compensated through an adjustment of the exchange rate in order to 
maintain the competitiveness of national products. The effect seems 
particularly important on continental welfare states. These 'frozen welfare 
states' did not implement important retrenchment programmes during the 
1980s. In order to maintain (or even to increase) the level of social benefits, 
they increased the level of social contribution (Palier 2000; Manow and Seils, 
2000; Palier and Martin, 2008). This solution, politically easier than 
retrenchment in a context where insured salaried people prefer to pay more 
in order to guarantee the same level of social protection, appeared to be 
maladapted in the new economic context. It is only under the constraints 
imposed by Maastricht that, in Continental Europe, a change occurred in the 
policies implemented: instead of increasing social contribution, they started to 
reduce the level of social benefits.  
Discrepancies between European economic policies and 
national social policies 
During the 1990s, European policies aimed at deepening European economic 
integration changed the general economic context in which social policies are 
implemented. The single market altered the economic environment of 
welfare states. In this context, critiques of the welfare state blossomed. 
Welfare transfers and services are more often seen as comprising an element 
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of rigidity, as a burden for companies (labour cost) and states (budget deficits) 
which try to compete in new, integrated single market. Passive and costly 
welfare programmes are increasingly denounced as impeding the 
competitiveness of firms and countries in this new context. Recognition and 
response to these issues is said to require a radical adaptation of welfare states. 
This adaptation implies not only policies of retrenchment in social policy, but 
also a general change to render it more market- and employment-friendly. 
This shift has sometimes been theorised as a global shift from the typical 
‘Keynesian welfare state’, where social policy is seen as favouring 
consumption and growth, to a ‘Schumpetarian workfare state’, aimed at 
strengthening the competitiveness of national economies and at subordinating 
welfare policy to the demands of flexibility (Jessop 1994).  
 In the same vein, the Maastricht treaty should not be seen as imposing 
only technical criteria for the single currency. It also meant that all the 
European countries accepted a profound shift in the economic policy 
paradigm: the norm is now a sound public budget, limited debt, and a low 
inflation rate (which means both wage moderation and stabilisation of the 
level of social contributions).  
 Deregulation, increased competition, limitation of budgetary and state 
deficits, low inflation: these elements associated with the single market and 
the single currency correspond to a coherent (neo-classical) economic vision, 
based on supply-side economic policies, promoting free competition and 
budgetary restriction. With the single market and currency, the main goal of 
macro-economic policy definitively changed, from fighting unemployment 
(through reflation policy) to fighting inflation (though monetarist and strict 
budgetary policy). Peter Hall has shown how this shift from Keynesian to 
monetarist policies occurred in the late 1970s in UK, and in the early 1980s 
in France (Hall 1986). The single market and Maastricht have brought about 
this kind of shift at the European level. Meanwhile, the welfare state appeared 
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to still be associated with the earlier macro-economic policy paradigm, based 
on Keynes' ideas. 
 If most national macro-economic policies went through a paradigmatic 
shift during the 1980s (Jobert 1994), in the 1980s and 1990s national social 
policies remained within the (Keynesian) logic of the past. Three reasons may 
explain this discrepancy. First, social policies were stuck in the past because of 
policy lock-in, institutional stickiness and resilience, which prevent them 
from rapid paradigmatic change (as Paul Pierson (1994, 1998, 2001) has 
convincingly shown). Second, few governments tried to implement major 
changes, preferring to use social policies as buffers to smooth the 
consequences (mainly rising unemployment) of economic policy changes. 
Third, while the orientation of economic policy is now defined at the 
European level, social policy is supposed to remain a national concern, 
rendering a pan-European change in welfare orientation more difficult. Thus, 
alongside the ‘real causes’ of welfare state difficulties – global and domestic 
changes – another set of problems appeared during the 1990s: an increasing 
contradiction between European economic policies and national social 
policies. Economic policies are now decided at the European level when 
social policies are still – formally – decided at the national one; economic 
policies are now based on a neo-classical, supply-side approach while national 
social policies are still linked with Keynesian, demand-side approaches. 
Re-aligning social policies with macro-economic policies 
However, in many countries and for many experts, Keynesian social policies 
appeared to be too contradictory with the new economic policies. 
Governments that had to follow the mainstream European economic line and 
wanted to limit budget deficits, to increase firms’ competitiveness and to 
reduce inflation, found it difficult to see their social expenditure grow, to 
increase taxation and social contributions for welfare, and to continue to 
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deliver ‘passive’ benefits. Increasingly, the issue of welfare reforms has been 
not only to cope with ageing or labour market changes, but also to re-adapt, 
to re-align the social policy paradigm to the new global economic paradigm. 
By the end of the 1990s, reforms seem increasingly oriented to restructuring 
(not only retrenching) social policies (Palier and Martin, 2008).  
 When looking at the goals and instruments of the reforms (more than 
their outcomes), there are some common trends in the different European 
countries. In pensions, using different paths, most of the countries are now 
developing a multi-pillar system that includes both Paygo and funded 
schemes, with an emphasis on the tight link between the level of the pension 
and the volume of contribution paid. This is a particularly important change 
for systems mainly based on social insurance and Paygo, such as in continental 
countries (Bonoli and Palier 2008). In healthcare systems, the introduction of 
managed competition seems to be spreading over all national health systems, 
but has also penetrated health insurance systems through competition among 
insurers, as in Germany and the Netherlands (Hassenteufel and Palier 2008). 
Employment policies are now focused on stimulating labour supply, and 
activation strategies are becoming central, even though there are still big 
differences in implementation (Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004, Clegg 
2008). As a consequence, increasing the employment rates has emerged as a 
general objective (to cope with unemployment and pension problems). Here 
again, this trend implies an important change for the Bismarckian welfare 
state, which adopted a ‘welfare state without work’ strategy during the 1980s 
(Esping-Andersen 1996).  
 All these trends can be understood as a general attempt to adapt social 
policies to supply-side economic policies. Nowadays, all national European 
governments seem to recognise that welfare states should be compatible with 
international competition. They should become ‘employment friendly’ in 
reducing their costs (especially non-wage costs) and offering benefits that do 
not creative disincentives (activation, making work pay). Welfare should rely 
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not only on public intervention, but also draw on other actors contributing 
to the welfare mix (family, NGOs, private firms) (Daniel and Palier 2001). 
This re-orientation implies fundamental reforms in social protection, in as 
much as they involve not only modifying existing parameters and instruments 
of social policy, but also changing the overall logic of established social 
protection. The new approach focuses less on protecting individuals against 
risk, and more on changing their behaviour.  It is a question of moving from 
a guarantee of replacement income outside of the market 
(‘decommodification’) to a strategy of providing incentives (in a more or less 
coercive fashion) for a return to the labour market (‘recommodification’). 
 One could argue that all these changes are not specific to Europe. The 
new economic challenges may be more due to the globalisation process than 
to European integration per se, and the common trends of welfare reform are 
also visible in other non-European countries. However, it is within the 
European single market that European firms and states have encountered 
increased economic competition. It is also with the Maastricht criteria that a 
lot of countries have had progressively to change their traditional use of social 
policies. During the 1990s, the idea that the traditional welfare state had 
become ill-adapted to the new economic environment and policies has 
developed in parallel with European integration. Therefore, one can argue 
that European integration and European economic policies have played an 
important role as an intervening variable in European welfare reforms. 
Moreover, the search for new solutions, compatible with economic 
requirements but socially acceptable, has become part of EU activities. 
Looking for European solutions   
The literature on linkages between international factors and welfare state 
changes usually looks at the absence or presence of problems created by 
globalisation and/or European integration for welfare states. However, there 
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is another way of looking at the relationship between European integration 
and welfare states changes. Europe might also provide, or at least shape, 
specific solutions for the problems met by welfare states, whether or not 
caused by globalisation/European integration. Certain international agencies 
and epistemic communities have proposed ‘global solutions’ to perceived 
welfare problems5. During the last years, European bodies attempted to 
influence this intellectual process aimed at re-designing social policy. 
Influencing national ideas in welfare policies has become one of the main 
targets of the EU, through the ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC). This 
new European activity started with the Luxembourg process launched in 
1997 and concerned employment policies; it expanded with the Lisbon 
process launched in 2000 and concerned pension and social exclusion as well 
as healthcare.  
 With OMC, European bodies have created a new form of intervention 
that is less aimed at institutional harmonisation or legislation than at 
harmonising ideas, knowledge and norms of action, in order to have policy 
goals converging towards ‘a common political vision’. OMC is spreading this 
strategy to more and more policy fields. The aim is ‘to organise a learning 
process about how to cope with the common challenges of the global 
economy in a coordinated way while also respecting national diversity.’6 The 
aim here is to achieve a Europeanisation of social policy paradigm (Radaelli 
2003). 
 In order to understand this process of Europeanisation, one has to 
explain how the fields of employment and social policy entered the European 
agenda, despite the subsidiarity principle. Here again, the interaction between 
economic and social policy dynamics is central. This new form of European 
intervention emerged from a competition between economic and social 
actors in Europe, and tries to solve the double problem of European Welfare 
states in the context of European economic integration: the Keynesian/ 
supply-side opposition, the national versus European locus of decision. 
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The political need for a more social Europe 
During national debates on the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, many 
European governments discovered that European integration was not always 
perceived as a good thing by their citizens who saw only economic 
constraints, not social advantages in European integration. In these 
circumstances, some European actors tried to promote a more social Europe, 
aimed at favouring full employment in a period of economic recession (1992-
1993), in order to increase its legitimacy. Jacques Delors' white book Growth, 
competitiveness and employment, published in 1993, tried to link European 
macro-economic policy with welfare reforms aimed at rising employment 
levels. In September 1993, the European Employment Initiative was 
launched by the party of European Socialists. Influenced by its Nordic 
members, it attempted to rework the Delors’ white book and to better 
connect issues of welfare and employment (Wincott 2003). 
 In similar circumstances, the Directorate-General for Employment and 
Social Affairs (called DGV before the Commission reform) had two 
recommendations on social protection adopted by the European Council in 
1992. The first concerned sufficient resources and social assistance in social 
protection systems. The second proposed a convergence of social protection 
objectives and policies, aimed at ‘improving and modernising national social 
protection systems’.7 This recommendation began promoting the reduction of 
‘social burdens’ (i.e. social contributions) on firms, aimed to make social 
protection more employment-friendly, to move from a passive to an active 
social policy framework. As for employment policies, the idea of using the 
classic European method of integration was given up in favour of a softer 
approach, elaborating common objectives for different national policies.  
 Following these orientations, in the Essen Summit in 1994, the 
European Council adopted five different axes around which to organise 
convergence of national employment policies: the improvement of 
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employment opportunities; increasing the employment intensity of growth; 
development of active labour market policies; targeting of measures to re-
activate the long-term unemployed; reduction of non-wage labour costs to 
encourage employers to hire low-skilled workers (Delaporte and Pochet 
2002). However, until 1997, no real effort was made at the European level to 
follow through on these new strategies. It is the deepening of the 
competition over welfare issues between ‘economically-oriented’ actors and 
‘socially-oriented’ European actors that increased the involvement of 
European institutions in social policies.  
A ‘race to the social’ 
Since 1997 employment policies and since 2000 social protection (especially 
policies dealing with pensions and with social exclusion) have been formally 
included in European competence under the specific procedure of OMCs. 
The arrival of employment and social policies on the European agenda and in 
its procedures can be understood as an unintended consequence (a spill-over 
effect) of European economic and monetary integration. While most of the 
literature on the spill-over of European economic integration on social 
policies foresaw a ‘race to the bottom’, very few predicted a competition over 
competence in social fields between different European organisations, leading 
to innovation in European social policy orientation and practices. In the field 
of employment policy as well as in the field of social protection, 
‘economically-oriented’ actors tried to pre-empt the definition of policy 
orientation so that welfare reforms could conform their own economic 
nostrums. ‘Socially-oriented’ actors reacted in alarm, lobbying national 
governments and promoting an alternative social policy orientation.8 By the 
mid 1990s, national governments were more favourably oriented to social 
policy and reacted positively by launching new European social strategies but 
with an intergovernmental form. 
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Towards an European employment strategy 
After the Essen summit, the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, (previously called DGII), seized on the European Council’s new 
interest in employment policy to promote its own (neo-liberal) views on 
these policies. For instance, after 1997, DGII added a paragraph on 
employment to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines they proposed. In it, 
they asked for more flexibility, denounced the disincentive effects of social 
benefits, rigidities of labour legislation, etc. Meanwhile, in some reports, the 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) was asking for a more flexible labour 
market and more liberal employment policies. The risk was that Europe 
promoted neo-liberal employment policies, in line with the development of 
the single market.  
 In reaction, DGV (now DG Empl) tried to counteract these trends by 
juxtaposing the term security to flexibility in Commission texts. Meanwhile, 
it lobbied national governments to make employment an explicit, positive 
goal of the Union. DGV claimed that otherwise, national Ministers of 
Employment would be stripped of their role by the Council of Economic 
and Finance Ministers (Mandin 2001). Such proposals met a favourable 
political juncture: newcomers in Europe (Austria, Finland and Sweden joined 
the EU in 1995) had pro-social policy traditions; meanwhile, left/social 
democratic governments were increasingly numerous across Europe. In this 
context, a new chapter on employment was included in the Amsterdam 
treaty, so that Europe explicitly recognised the goal of full employment. In 
June 1997, the recently elected French socialist Prime minister, Lionel Jospin, 
pressed European countries to take action in this field even before the Treaty 
was adopted. An exceptional summit on employment was organised in 
Luxembourg in November 1997 to launch the European Employment 
Strategy (EES). Since the Amsterdam Treaty was then not yet adopted, all the 
processes it launched were purely voluntary in approach. 
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Competing for the definition of welfare reforms 
The same kind of process occurred in social protection. With the adoption of 
the Growth and Stability Pact, European ‘economically-oriented’ actors 
(especially DGII and the EPC) believed that they had responsibility for 
guaranteeing that member states balance their budgets. The pact asserted that 
a stable single currency needed sound public finance. Economic actors 
promoted an extensive version of the pact, imposing the view that public 
expenditure had to be controlled or even diminished for the sake of a stable 
Euro. Multiple reports and studies from the ECP committee and DGII 
showed that for many European countries public spending increased most for 
health, and that demographic ageing would soon cause a sharp increase in 
public pension expenditure. They started to suggest 'structural reforms' of 
health and pension systems (especially to Continental European countries, 
whose social protection expenditure was among the highest and the least 
controlled). These reforms often meant a partial privatisation of health and 
pension systems.9  
 In reaction, members of DGV argued that left to unfold, these 
European dynamics would lead to the dismantling of national welfare systems 
and the demise of the European social model (Mandin 2001). In July 1999, 
just before it resigned, the Santer Commission adopted a communication 
proposing ‘A concerted strategy for modernising social protection’ aimed at 
combining economic efficiency with social justice. In this context, Portugal 
prepared its presidency of the Union (for the first half of 2000) and convinced 
European governments that national welfare reforms should be coordinated 
through a balanced compromise between economic requirements and social 
objectives. In March 2000, during the Lisbon summit, the principle of the 
open method of coordination was adopted, with implemention planned in 
several fields, including social protection (pensions, social exclusion/inclusion, 
making work pay, healthcare). 
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A New Welfare Policy Mix 
The story of the competition between DGII and DGV reflects the growing 
contradiction between macro-economic policies implemented at the 
European level and the ‘European (national) social model(s)’. The solutions 
promoted at the European level reflect an on-going attempt to find a new 
compromise between economic and social policies, between European 
economic integration and persisting distinctive national welfare regimes. In 
terms of content, this reconciliation seems based on modernisation and 
improvement of the social model more than a recasting of economic policies. 
On the governance side, the difficulty is to combine a common approach 
with the acknowledgement of national sovereignty. 
A European compromise between competitiveness and 
equity 
DGII or ECP proposals for employment and social policies, reflect 
approaches developed at the international global level by the World Bank or 
OECD in the late 1980s, early 1990s. These are social policies for an almost 
purely neo-liberal world, where solutions are always market-driven, with as 
minimal a role for the State as possible. While these solutions could perhaps 
be implemented in the liberal welfare regimes (and even there, as Pierson 
(1994) has shown, nothing radical could be developed), they appeared too 
brutal for the European tradition (as DGV and many members states felt). 
Some reformulation and compromise was required to adapt these ideas to the 
so-called ‘European social model’ (Wincott 2003).  
 Whenever the European Council adopts a text on either employment 
or social policy, it is based on an ambiguous trade off between economic and 
social orientations: ‘flexicurity’ has become the buzz-word in employment 
policies; pensions should be both sustainable (financial viability) and adequate 
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(as high level as possible, but corresponding to individual contribution). In 
healthcare, the slogans are equality of access and quality combined with 
financial viability. The general orientation given to social policy guidelines 
elaborated at the European level is to reconcile economic growth with social 
concerns.  
 Much conceptual work has been launched by the EU (mainly DGV 
and some presidencies) in order to elaborate a new compromise between 
economic and social policy. The Lisbon Summit of 2000 was prepared with a 
focus on the knowledge-based economy and reforming social policy. Several 
major studies were commissioned from European experts.10 Similarly, for the 
preparation of the Belgian presidency, which also identified modernising 
social policy as a major theme, a report on a new social architecture for 
Europe was commissioned.11 In this new approach, social policies must focus 
more on prevention and social investment than on compensating for 
immediate difficulties. In its declaration, the EU is promoting the goal of 
“quality” as a way to reconcile economic and social policies. Social policy is 
constructed as a necessary feature of a well-functioning modern economy, 
particularly one that hopes to position itself in the high stakes of the 
knowledge economy. For the EU, promoting quality in employment and 
social policy is a key element in reaching the goals of building more and 
better jobs, creating a competitive and cohesive knowledge-based economy, 
and ensuring a positive mutual interaction between economic, employment 
and social policies. As such, quality goes hand in hand with improving 
efficiency, especially as far as public finances and labour market incentives are 
concerned (Jenson and Pochet 2003). One can also read these compromises 
in the guidelines that are yearly produced in the framework of the various 
open methods of coordination.12 The aim here is always to achieve a more 
integrated approach between economic, employment and social policies. The 
recent reforms of EES and OMC processes go even further in that direction 
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since it was decided in March 2003 to synchronise the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines and the European Employment Strategy.  
 If, theoretically, the issue is to find a new balance between 
competitiveness and solidarity (Goetshy 1999), it seems, however, that at 
present economic processes are able to impose most of their views on 
employment policies. For instance, in March 2003, the new integrated 
approach to economic and employment policies guidelines emphasised the 
necessity to moderate wages and to remember the importance of making 
labour markets more flexible. Furthermore, in 2005, the reform of the 
various OMCs aimed at merging all the processes together to be simplified 
and concentrated more on the goals of economic growth and job creation. 
However, we have seen that the content of European social policies is not 
always going in a downwards direction, the defensive reaction of national 
member states and ‘socially-oriented’ actors having been able to redress the 
balance towards a more social Europe. In 2008, The BEPA is preparing a 
new social agenda for the EU, concentrating on “Opportunities, access and 
solidarity”13. Although its content might change in the future, it is already 
clear that the new orientation for social policies (the EES and OMC) helps 
national welfare states to leave the good old Keynesian world and to find new 
principles and functions, and a new general architecture for social policies, so 
that they will be more in line with supply-side economic policies. This 
emphasises an important issue of current and forthcoming welfare state 
reforms, which is to elaborate and organise a social policy paradigm shift, so 
that economic and social policies can be reconciled.  
 At the policy-making level, OMC is an attempt to combine European 
orientation with national sovereignty.  
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European coordination of national policies 
The new OMC is an attempt to articulate the European and the national 
levels through a new multi-level governance arrangement. National 
governments were long reluctant to give European bodies any social policy 
competence. When they did so for the employment strategy in 1997, a means 
had to be found to preserve national autonomy for the policies. Governments 
were faced with a spill-over process that started to involve a new field. 
Instead of resisting and keeping the domain solely national, member states 
created a new European competence, but in an intergovernmental way, 
which allowed them to implement the reforms they wanted and/or that fitted 
with their own welfare regime.  
 While already proposed in the recommendation in 1992 on 
modernising social protection (Delaporte and Pochet 2002), this new 
procedure was inspired by the preparation for the single currency: common 
objectives were adopted (the Maastricht Criteria) and each national 
government chose its own way to reach them (different roads leading to 
EMU). According to the Portugal Presidency the aim is ‘to combine 
coherence with respect for diversity and efficiency with democratic 
legitimacy. It is a case of defining strategic guidelines at European level for 
coping with structural change and then organising a process whereby 
Member States emulate each other in applying them, stimulating the 
exchange of best practices, while taking account of national characteristics.’ 
The objective is to overcome the contradiction between the two levels of 
decision, to combine European orientation with national capacities to 
implement their own reforms. 
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A ‘leverage effect’ at the national level 
OMC is supposed to work differently from the classical European method of 
integration. Instead of regulations or directives imposed from above to be 
equally applied in all member states, the OMC coordinates different national 
policies around a policy vision. Therefore, one should not expect OMC to 
function like the classical method of European integration. One should not 
look for an impact of OMC guidelines analogous to the impact of a directive 
on national law. The policy guidelines should not be read as directives that 
are more or less transposed and applied in the different countries. National 
policies remain oriented by national actors, trying to address national issues, 
keeping national trajectories. 
 Does this mean that OMC is purely symbolic with no real significance 
for understanding national welfare reforms? Even if it is difficult to trace 
empirically the influence of ideas, we have shown that more and more 
national welfare reforms, in their overall logic, echo the vision promoted at 
the European level. Moreover, analysis of the interaction between French 
employment and pensions policies and the EES and OMC show that if OMC 
does not dictate the orientation of the French policies, it provides national 
actors with European resources which might help them in their action at the 
national level (Barbier and Sylla 2001; Coron and Palier 2002; Ehrel, 
Mandin, and Palier 2005). During interviews on the influence of OMC or 
EES on their actions, French political or administrative actors denied any 
direct impact but mentioned a ‘leverage effect’ produced by the instrument 
developed within the OMCs. The question was less to see whether they were 
‘implementing’ OMC guidelines than whether these were useful to them in 
their interaction with other national actors. OMC becomes a supplementary 
resource for national actors more than a non-negotiable external constraint. 
They used OMC procedures, guidelines, orientations, and instruments as a 
lever to get their own position to win or to legitimise certain reforms.14  
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 OMCs are providing new resources for national actors, instead of 
imposing new policies from above. However, when national actors use these 
new instruments and resources, they also import and incorporate the general 
orientation on which the OMCs are based. One can of course claim that the 
effect of OMCs is more than marginal on national policies, since the interests 
that have used OMC tools were already present in the national context, and 
since political choices could be made without considering the European 
orientation. Yet, one could also argue that this was the case for the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Stability Pact: most of the shift to a new macro-economic 
orientation was already made before 1992, the paradigmatic shift in economic 
policies occurring during the 1980s in many European countries, notably the 
UK and France (Hall 1986). However, the process of coordination of macro-
economic policies associated with Maastricht and the Stability Pact has 
created a new institutional context supposed to guarantee the continuity of 
the new policies at the European level.15 One could argue that the OMCs 
will have this kind of role, safeguarding the coherence and coordination of 
new employment and social policies adapted to and compatible with the new 
economic policy orientations. 
Conclusion  
The paper has argued that an element of the crisis of the welfare state is often 
neglected in the current literature. This element derives from a double 
discrepancy: many economic policies are now decided at the European level 
when social policies are still -–formally – decided at the national one; 
economic policies are now based on a neo-classical, supply-side approach 
while national social policies were still linked with Keynesian, demand-side 
approaches. All the new policies aimed at coordinating employment and 
social policies at the European level try to resolve this crisis in offering a 
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perspective for reconciling economic and social policies, and in articulating 
European and national policies.  
 Whether these new policies are efficient is an open question, but one 
which should not be asked in the same terms as for the classic European 
method of integration. OMC does not pretend to impose the same law on 
all, but to elaborate a common European political vision of social policies and 
to spread new orientation for welfare reforms at the national level. Between 
global pressures and domestic structures, Europe acts as a catalyst. One should 
probably try to understand the kind of intellectual influence Europe may have 
on welfare reforms if one wants to understand welfare state changes. 
However, this implies first a change in the conception of what a reform is, 
and second to use certain approach in public policy analysis, which focuses on 
the role of ideas.  
 The European contribution to the transformation of welfare state will 
be more visible if we analyse reforms less in terms of adjustments or 
adaptations to shocks (such as globalisation or population ageing), less as a 
function of existing institutions and past policies, and more in terms of public 
policies constructed through social interaction increasingly involving 
European institutions. The point here is not to deny the importance of 
objective problems or of national political institutions. It is to say that 
identifying the cause of the difficulties as well as the institutional constraints is 
not enough to understand both the process and the orientation of a reform 
aimed at coping with these problems. To understand how certain solutions 
prevail, cognitive and normative aspects of the policy-making process have to 
be considered. The process of elaborating a reform is also an intellectual 
process, in which European ideas are playing an increasing role, leading to a 
stronger integration of economic, employment and social policies. Whether 
economic policy will impose its own agenda to social policies depends on the 
way national and European actors, instead of following the basic market-
driven path, try to re-invent and implement a ‘new European social model’. 
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Notes  
1 I would like to thank Eero Carroll, Peter Hall, Karl Hinrichs, Jane Jenson, Julia O’Connor, 
Yves Surel and Daniel Wincott for their helpful comments on earlier version of this paper. Part 
of this work has been possible thanks to the support of the Canadian Policy Research 
Networks Inc., ‘Social architecture papers’ of the Family network. http://www.cprn.org and 
to CONNEX. 
2 Esping-Andersen (ed.) 1996; Ferrera, Rhodes (eds), 2000; Scharpf, Schmidt (eds), 2000; 
Taylor-Gooby (ed.) 2001; Leibfried (ed.), 2001; Pierson (ed.), 2001; Huber, Stevens 2002; 
Swank 2002. 
3 ‘The available evidence casts doubt on the claim that in the absence of growing economic 
integration welfare states would be under dramatically less pressure, and national policy-makers 
markedly more capable of addressing new public demands.’ (Pierson, 1998, p.541). 
4 C. Radaelli argues that ‘the concept of Europeanisation refers to a set of processes through 
which the EU political, social and economic dynamics become part of the logic of domestic 
discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.’ (2000, p.4). 
5 On the World Bank’s views on employment and social policies, see Holzmann and Jorgensen 
2000; On OECD’s approaches, See Armingeon and Beyeler 2004. 
6 Note from the Portuguese presidency ‘The on-going experience of the Open Method of 
Coordination’, 13 June 2000. 
7 Council recommendation of 27 July 1992 (92/442/CEE), OJ L245 of 26 August 1992. 
8 Economically-oriented actors correspond to the ex-DGII (economic and finance affairs), 
different lobbies of insurers, bankers, employers and the Economic Policy Committee. 
Socially-oriented actors correspond to the ex-DGV (employment and social affairs), and later 
the Employment Comittee, and the Social Protection Committee. The two terms correspond 
to the vocabulary used by the actors themselves (at least within interviews) and have been used 
in various research, See Mandin 2001, and Delaporte and Pochet 2002. 
9 If texts published by the DGII remain implicit, interviews with European civil servants from 
DGII are unambiguous on this point. DGII has been appointed to build Europe on a market 
base: actors there do not see why social protection and employment policies should be 
exempted from that frame. 
10 Maria Rodrigues, the former Portuguese minister of social policy, was in charge of organising 
the Lisbon Summit.  She spent six months visiting all countries in order to prepare the 
consensus on the new objectives and methods, and she appointed major European experts such 
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as Maurizio Ferrera, Martin Rhodes, Anton Hemerijck, Anne-Marie Guillemard, and Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen to prepare reports on the future of social policy in Europe. 
11 A revised version was published as Gøsta Esping-Andersen (ed.), 2002. 
12 For a detailed analysis of these guidelines, see Delaporte and Pochet 2002, and Pochet and 
Zeitlin 2005. 
13 See the 2007 Communication from the Commission, COM(2007) 726, “Opportunities, 
access and solidarity: towards a new social vision for 21st century Europe”. 
14 For detailed analysis of this ‘leverage effect’, see Coron and Palier 2002, and Ehrel, Mandin 
and Palier 2005. 
15 The 2004 discussion of the Growth and Stability Pact by Germany and France reveals a 
hypocritical double game. While they contest the rigidities of the pact at the European level, 
they meanwhile adopt very restrictive welfare reforms at home, such as the 2003 pension 
reform and the 2004 healthcare reform in France, or all the new measures decided in 2003 in 
Germany concerning old age and health insurance. 
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